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The relationship between education
and philosophy has changed dramatically
between ancient and contemporary eras.
In the ancient era, educated citizens were
encouraged to practice philosophy as a
way of life. Today, in American public
higher education, philosophy, as well as
other disciplines within the humanities,
are classified as less practical and
efficient. Therefore, philosophy’s low
job-market value renders a slim job
perspective for students, mainly because
of the highly specialized and marketdriven education system. Yet disciplines
with higher market values, such as the
STEM 1 fields and other professional
programs, lack sufficient guidance
on the maturation of philosophical
capacities, which require deliberate
effort beyond what specialized expertise
or technical education offers alone.
The deficiency of philosophical
development across the disciplines leads
to the perpetuation of the enduring
conflicts
within
American
higher
education, as these conflicts are traced
back to the ancient era. Students across
many disciplines are deprived of the
opportunity in their fields to regularly
exercise their philosophical capacities.
Exercising
philosophical
capacities,
such as argument analysis, logical
reasoning, decision making, identifying
assumptions underlying methods and
beliefs, sympathetic understanding, and
adroit perspective shifting can foster a
transformative learning experience that
improves the personal, social, ethical, and
cultural dimensions, while enhancing the
quality of professional life.

My observations of philosophy’s
present role within American public higher
education led me to further investigate two
conflicts that contribute to philosophy’s
marginalization and devaluation today:
1. Traditional vs. Progressive values in
educational approaches.2
2. Specialized job training vs.
Philosophical development (self
development).3
These two conflicts are deeply rooted
in the ancient era and have carried on
into our present day culture, consequently
distorting the common conception of
philosophy in a way that misrepresents
the nature and function of philosophy’s
prospective role in academia and the
larger society.
In recognizing the shift in philosophy’s
role between ancient and contemporary
times, I draw a comparison between
ancient Socratic and ancient Confucian
educational approaches that suggest that
philosophy, as an activity or practice,
can become integrated as a foundational
component of American public higher
education.4 Through the examination of
these two ancient pedagogies, I emphasize
that the two conflicts that currently
contribute to philosophy’s marginalization
and devaluation were present in ancient
times as well. The purpose of showing
that the two conflicts existed in the two
ancient cultures is to demonstrate that
historically,
philosophical
pedagogy
has become a foundational component
of educational approaches despite the
presence of these two conflicts, without
necessarily abandoning cultural traditions
and practical skills. Furthermore, because

1. STEM refers to the Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics fields.
2. Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, trans. Michael
Chase (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 1995).
3. Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002). Judy Whipps,
“’Learn to Earn’: A Pragmatist Response to Contemporary Dialogues about Industrial Education,” The
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 22, no. 1 (2008): 59-67.
4. In this version, I include only a brief version of the ancient Socratic and ancient Confucian comparison
as an introduction to a larger work that I plan to pursue in the future. In the larger work, I will include a
detailed comparative analysis that thoroughly covers the depth and details of both ancient approaches in
isolation from one another through the themes of Purpose of Education, Teacher/Student Relationship,
Leaning/Attaining Knowledge, and Teaching/Attaining Knowledge.
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of the very fact that both Socrates and
Confucius valued and implemented
philosophical development within their
education, I argue that the present
conflicts in academia are insufficient
explanations for philosophy’s present state
of marginalization.
I use Socratic inquiry, textual analysis,
and comparative techniques throughout
this exploration. Socratic inquiry has
been the initial and underlying method
that I practice. Asking myself what
“philosophy” is, what “education” is, and
attempting to understand the present
relation between the two in relation to the
past has led me to critically analyze and
reflect on my culture, my education, and
my career. As I live in these conditions,
I find myself compelled to inquire. I
use textual analysis for gathering data,
in which I interpret works of previous
scholars and philosophers in order to
ground my inquiries and situate myself
in the broad topics of philosophy and
education. I use comparison techniques
not only to elucidate the value differences
between ancient Socratic and ancient
Confucian education in both cultures, but
also to reiterate that these value conflicts
between learning practical skills and
philosophical development, as well as
traditional and progressive values, existed
within ancient pedagogy.
Before I proceed, I will first provide
a brief overview of the background and
significance regarding my concern for
philosophical development in American
higher education. In doing so, I illuminate
some early reactions to the enduring
conflicts that have manifested within
contemporary American educational
approaches. From there, I move on to
discuss the dynamics of the value conflicts
within and between ancient Socratic
and ancient Confucian educational
approaches, which leads into a discussion
of Pierre Hadot’s interpretation of the
isolation of philosophy within universities
and the consequences of that shift

in philosophy’s role. After describing
Hadot’s distinction between philosophical
discourse and philosophy itself, I turn my
focus back to American higher education
through Martha Nussbaum’s discussion
of
Liberal Education’s persistent
emphasis on personal, social, ethical, and
cultural development and its intimate
relationship with philosophy. I deduce
from Nussbaum’s interpretation that the
Liberal Education tradition in American
higher education serves as a model for
how philosophical exercises can become
implemented across all disciplines, or in an
interdisciplinary context, without having
to specialize in the field of philosophy.
Philosophy’s Role in American
Public Higher Education
Since public education funding
primarily comes from government
subsidies, and the government prioritizes
funds that have higher market value,
“administrators see little option except to
respond to the marketplace, for if their
institution does not react effectively, it
will not have the necessary resources to
offer high quality and diverse academic
programs.”5 With job placement as the
educational priority and the funding
priorities directed toward the STEM
fields because of higher job market
values, curricula focus on producing
highly specialized experts through
means of memorization and technical
job training in highly competitive
environments. Due to the conditions of
the learning environment, along with the
requirements of those disciplines, students
lack proficient training in developing
philosophical capacities that aim at selfdevelopment, which complement their
professional development.
During the rise of American
industrialization in the 19th century, Jane
Addams, an American social activist and
philosopher, witnessed the disparities
between the educational requirements at

the time and the social cooperative skills
required for progressive, industrialized
work.6 Addams captures how cultural
values affected educational priorities
during the Industrial Revolution. In
doing this, she implies that the traditional
societal values of rural culture could
not maintain the demands of the new,
industrial conditions of city life: “The
early ideal of a city that it was a marketplace in which to exchange produce,
and a mere trading-post for merchants,
apparently still survives in our minds and
is constantly reflected in our schools.”7
Subsequently, Addams describes how the
societal priority of meeting the nature
and demands of the marketplace hinders
the quality of education citizens receive,
which in turn perpetuates classism and the
priority of narrow, specialized education
within the culture: “We [Industrializing
American society] admire much more
the men who accumulate riches, and
who gather to themselves the results
of industry, than the men who actually
carry forward industrial processes; and,
as has been pointed out, our schools still
prepare children almost exclusively for
commercial and professional life.”8
Around sixty years after Addams shared
her concerns about the effects of new citylife demands in the midst of industrialization
on the one hand, and educational values on
the other, American psychologist Rachel M.
Lauer observed that public school education
in the United States “does not yet include
in its curriculum one of the most exciting
subjects known to man: the subject of his
own inner life—his own feelings, reactions,
and desires.”9 A low priority of fostering
self-awareness and social engagement in
American public education moves Lauer to
challenge educators’ assumptions about the
primary function of education and illuminate
the conditions of the learning environment
that arise based on those assumptions. She
critiques the educators that teach “under
the assumption that everything worth
learning lies outside the learner.”10 Here,

5. Peter D. Eckel and Jacqueline E. King, An Overview of Higher Education in the United States: Diversity, Access, and the Role of the Market Place (Washington
D.C.: Springer, 2004), 16.
6. Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 81-97.
7. Ibid, 86.
8. Ibid. Addams uses the term “industrial,” to mean cooperative endeavors rather than how we commonly use the term in reference to factory manufacturing today. See
Marilyn Fischer’s “Introduction” to Newer Ideals of Peace, vol. 3 of Jane Addams’ Writings on Peace (2003).
9. Rachel M. Lauer, “General Semantics and the Future of Education,” ETC; a Review of General Semantics, 24, (1967): 391.
10. Ibid, 393.
11. Ibid.
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Lauer criticizes a learning environment that
consists of memorization, independence,
and competition. The denial of selfdevelopment and interpersonal awareness
in education “actually defeats the schools’
most avowed purpose, which is to develop
cognitive competency.”11
Philosophical Discourse Vs.
Philosophy Itself
With philosophy limited in its own
specialized field, along with existing
value conflicts within public education,
a common misconception permeates
throughout society and in many
quarters of its academic institutions that
philosophy, as an academic discipline, is
limited to theoretical discourse and absent
of praxis in occupational settings. Pierre
Hadot believes the distinction between
philosophy as an activity and philosophy
as an intellectual discourse originated in
the Middle Ages, when universities were
established for “professionals who train
professionals.”12 Consequently, educational
pursuits shifted from cultivating one’s life
in relation to one’s studies to intellectual
and professional training.
Isolated into its own discipline
and confined to the scholarship of
philosophical discourse within public
higher education, philosophy continues to
remain isolated from a large proportion
of students and generates the common
misconception that philosophy itself is
the same as the philosophical discourse.
Hadot’s distinction between philosophical
discourse and philosophy itself attempts
to reconcile the misunderstanding that
the two are synonymous. In doing this, he
accentuates the significance of philosophy
within and beyond academia.
Philosophical discourse consists of
theoretical instruction, dialogue with
others, self-reflection, and spiritual
exercises regarding sub-disciplines such as
logic, ethics, and metaphysics each distinct
from the other with its own compilation
of theories. In educational settings,

distinctions between these sub-disciplines
are necessary in order for professors to
efficiently teach the material, yet the
subject material may appear extracted and
sometimes even irrelevant from everyday
life. However, Hadot also emphasizes
the practical function of philosophical
discourse since it is often times categorized
as useless speculation that sends
interlocutors on an endless merry-goround ride: “Discourse always has, directly
or indirectly, a function which is formative,
educative, psychagogic, and therapeutic. It
is always intended to produce an effect,
to create a habitus within the soul, or to
provoke a transformation of the self.”13
In this sense, philosophical discourse
can be understood as an exercise that
facilitates a transformation of one’s life
outside of academia.
Hadot describes philosophy itself, or
as a way of life, as “the existential choice
of a certain way of life, the experience of
certain inner states and dispositions.”14
In other words, philosophy itself does
not refer to a distinct way of life separate
from the life of, for example, a natural
scientist, psychologist, or engineer. Rather,
philosophy is what makes up human life,
no matter what field of study or education
level. Living philosophically entails living,
testing, and adjusting the theories that
guide one’s everyday life, learned within but
not limited to the discourse encountered in
educational establishments. For example,
instead of only “philosophizing” (or
thinking) about ethical and logical theories,
a philosophical way of life entails living
an ethical and logical life, with frequent
validity-checks in the process. The totality
of one’s choices, influences, and beliefs
make up a philosophy, which in turn define
one’s character and overall quality of life.
As humans, we all live a philosophy in the
most basic sense, and refining our lived
philosophies can substantially change the
conditions in our world. Hence, philosophy
itself is no less important to humanity
than the importance of an individual’s life
philosophy to him/herself.

Hadot
describes
the
general
relationship
between
philosophical
discourse and philosophy itself as
incommensurable, yet inseparable.15 In
other words, although they are different
by definition, in that the discourse is
abstracted from common life experience,
both still influence one another
simultaneously. Philosophical discourse
“justifies, motivates, and influences”
the philosophical life.16 Our discourses
inform our lived philosophies, and our
lived philosophies are communicated and
justified through discourse.
Overview of Ancient Socratic and
Ancient Confucian Education
Before the rise of the university and
the specialized discipline of philosophy
branched off into its own separate
department, tensions had already existed
between educating for craft expertise
and education for self-development. In
Book VII of Plato’s Republic, Socrates
proclaims, “Education isn’t what some
people declare it to be, namely, putting
knowledge into the souls that lack it, like
putting sight into blind eyes (518b-c).”17
Here, Socrates refers to an educational
environment where an authority of
knowledge claims knowledge and
transmits information to students through
a series of lectures in which students learn
theories and skills to be applied to a craft
or expertise. Socrates displays a similar
disposition in the Symposium when he says,
“If only wisdom were like water, which
always flows from a full cup into an empty
one when we connect them with a piece
of yarn.”18 Socrates’ disposition reflects
his criticism of the Sophists for assuming
knowledge to be something that students
can pay tuition for and be guaranteed to
obtain through memorization, imitation,
and manipulation.
The Sophists, who Pierre Hadot
describes as, “Traditionally, people who
developed an apparently philosophical
discourse without trying to live their lives

12. Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, trans. Michael Chase (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 269.
13. Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy,? trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 176.
14. Ibid, 173-174.
15. Ibid, 172.
16. Ibid.
17. Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company 1992), 190.
18. Plato, Symposium, trans. Alexander Nehemas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 5.

27
VOLUME 15, 2011

in accordance with their discourse, and
without their discourse emanating from
their life experience,”19 and “democrats of
knowledge, who claimed to be able to sell
their knowledge to all comers,” claimed
to provide professional knowledge and
wisdom to the sons of wealthy Athenian
men.20 The Sophists were professional
educators who traveled and charged
fees to teach rhetoric, politics, sciences,
mathematics, and grammar in order to
prepare their students for citizenship and
professional life.21 In these circumstances,
the teacher/student roles were rigid,
little dialogue occurred, and the students
passively submitted to the expert.
In comparison to the Western
tradition of Socrates, Confucius viewed
learning similarly to both Socrates and
the Sophists in that he “defined the
aim of education to be more than just
the acquisition of knowledge, but more
fundamentally, a transformation of the
person and preparation for public service.”
Similar to Socrates’ pedagogy, Confucius
viewed education as a lifelong cultivation,
aiming toward living a virtuous life:23
“Do not worry over not having an official
position; worry about what it takes to
have one. Do not worry that no one
acknowledges you; seek to do what will
earn you acknowledgment” (4.14).24 Unlike
Socrates, however, Confucius introduced
the six arts to his students, which resembles
what we call a “liberal education” today.
The six arts included ritual, music, archery,
charioteering, writing, and arithmetic. In
this sense, Confucius focused more directly
on the practical/or public service aspect of
learning than Socrates. For example, in the
Analects, the Master stresses the importance
of embodying virtues through our actions
toward others over simply engaging in
intellectual study when he says:

(1.6) As a young brother and son,
be filial at home and deferential in
the community; be cautious in what
you say and then make good on your
word; love the multitude broadly
and be intimate with those who are
authoritative (ren) in their conduct.
If in so behaving you still have
energy left, use it to improve yourself
through study.25
(13.5) If people recite all of the
three hundred Songs and yet when
given official responsibility, fail to
perform effectively, or when sent to
distant quarters, are unable to act on
their own initiative, then even though
they have mastered so many of them,
what good are they to them?26
Socrates, on the other hand, denied
his title of “teacher” to make the point
that the knowledge he sought (moral
knowledge) was not something that could
be transferred from teacher to student,
but instead drawn out from within oneself
through rigorous questioning and selfexamination:
(Apology, 29e) Socrates: And if
some of you objects and claims that
he does care (for intelligence, for
truth, and for the best state of the
soul), then I will not release him
on the spot and go away, but I will
question him, examine him, and
refute him; and if he does not seem to
me to have acquired virtue, but says
that he has, I will reproach him with
attributing the least importance to
what is worth the most, and the most
importance to what is most base27
The difference I highlight here between
Socrates’ and Confucius’ pedagogies
illustrates that although both sought
virtue through philosophical discourse,

Confucius placed a larger emphasis on
serving the community through learning
the arts, mastering a set of skills, and
directly serving society.
In regard to the tension between
traditional and progressive values,
Socrates’ execution represents one of
the consequences that arose from the
traditional/progressive value conflicts,
since he was accused of corrupting the
youth because he “used skillful questions
to bring his interlocutors to admit their
ignorance and by doing so, he disturbed
them so much that they were eventually led
to question their entire lives.”28 Socrates
thought that teaching only conventional
or professional knowledge and skills used
in hierarchal learning environments,
where teachers have intellectual authority
over passive students and solely teach
rote learning, resulted in students acting
“under the influence of prejudices without
any basis in reflection,”29 imprudently
appealing to the authority of teachers, and
arrogantly believing that they were experts
in their profession. By denying the title of
teacher, Socrates intentionally disrupted
the teacher/student social hierarchy and
implicitly communicated to the student
that he assumed the role of a learner and
searched for the same knowledge. Dialogue
was the main form of interaction between
the teacher and student in Socrates’
approach and generally framed in a way
that exempted the teacher’s responsibility
of the content, as opposed to a less
interactive lecture-style.30
Similarly,
Confucius’
pedagogy
was “progressive” for his time, for he
“selectively and creatively”31 used passages
from the ancient texts in his teachings,
rather than blindly following the texts as if
the texts themselves had a predetermined,
fixed meaning in all given contexts

19. Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, 174.
20. Ibid, 26.
21. Jonathan Lavery, “Meet the Philosophers of Ancient Greece,” (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2005) “The Sophists,” http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy.gvsu.
edu/entry/ashgtpag/the_sophists (accessed August 30, 2011).
22. Peimin Ni, On Confucius, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2002), 6.
23. 23. Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 1998), 92.
24. Ibid, 72.
25. Ibid, 163.
26. Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, trans. R.E. Allen (New Haven: Yale University Press 1984), 95.
27. Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 149.
28. Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, 26.
29. Paul Woodruff, “Socratic Education” in Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (New York: Routledge 1998), 19-20.
30. Karyn Lai, “Learning From The Confucians: Learning From The Past,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 35, no. 1 (2008): 101.
31. Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, 192.
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and circumstances. Confucius even
discouraged his disciples from following
his own teachings in an unreflective
manner. On this matter Confucius said,
“In striving to be authoritative in your
conduct, do not yield even to your teacher
(15.36).”32 He was known as the first to
offer education to his disciples, whether
they were wealthy or poor. However, his
use of ancient texts as authority in his
teachings, his transmission of culture,
and his reinforcement of hierarchy can be
considered more traditional in relation to
the approach of Socratic education, which
is grounded on doubting and questioning
authorities. Although Confucius’ pedagogy
was progressive for his time, I reiterate my
point that regardless of the progressive
tendencies found in Confucius’ teachings,
his pedagogical style and methods were
more traditional than Socrates’ pedagogy
when we look in retrospect at the broader
historical context.
Conclusion
The overarching purpose of this
exploration is to expose the two conflicts
that affect the quality of American
public higher education today that also
arose within both ancient Socratic and
Confucian
pedagogies:
Specialized
training vs. philosophical development
and traditional vs. progressive pedagogical
values. Historically, philosophical pedagogy
has become a foundational component
of educational approaches despite the
presence of these two conflicts. Moreover,
in explaining how philosophical exercises
are used in the Liberal Education tradition,
I accentuate the point that philosophical
development is interdisciplinary and can
be extended out to other disciplines such
as the STEM fields.
The two conflicts that contribute to
philosophy’s present state in academia are
inadequate explanations for philosophy’s
present state of marginalization for the fact
that these conflicts will always be present.
They are inevitable, and can even be called
“philosophical problems.” Considering
that the ancient Confucian approach is
relatively more traditional AND more
skill oriented in comparison to the
ancient Socratic approach demonstrates

that philosophy itself is not polarized
one way or another, since both Socrates
and Confucius valued philosophical
development and implemented it within
their educational approaches.
Returning to the contemporary
age, I do not suggest that American
higher education entirely disregards selfdevelopment. In Cultivating Humanity:
A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal
Education, Martha Nussbaum connects
Liberal Education’s persistent emphasis
on personal, social, ethical, and cultural
development, which historically and
unavoidably connects to philosophy.
The Liberal Education tradition in the
United States serves as a model for how
philosophical discourse can be utilized
for developmental purposes, without
students having to specialize in the field
of philosophy. As a student studying
within the Philosophy and Liberal Studies
departments at Grand Valley State
University, I notice that philosophy’s role
in its own distinct discipline differs from
philosophy’s role in the Liberal Education
tradition.
In the discipline of philosophy, students
learn the history, theories, problems, and
methods of philosophical importance,
which depends on the specialization of
each department. Learning the methods of
philosophy benefits students’ knowledge of
philosophical topics, but it does not equate
to the benefits of practicing the discourses,
which facilitates self-development by
holding students logically, ethically, and
socially accountable for their practices.
The Liberal Education tradition
integrates all learning experiences and
philosophical capacities into a cohesive
whole, while constantly requiring the
student to relate that integration of
learning experiences back to his/her
self. Not only does the Liberal Education
tradition require students to integrate what
they learn back to themselves, but it also
aids students in developing capacities of
analytical inquiry, moral judgment, and
social responsibility. Professors of Liberal
Education not only expect their students to
learn philosophical methods of thinking,
but also to practice those methods through
the examination of many great historical

thinkers across a variety of disciplines,
cultures, and lifestyles, connecting social
issues from the past with the persisting social
issues of today. Developing philosophical
capacities through engaging historical
problems sharpens the application of those
capacities to the encounters we experience
everyday.
Primarily because of the highly
specialized nature of the disciplines
within American higher education, few
disciplines hold students accountable for
developing their philosophical capacities.
The advancement of philosophical
capacities does not necessarily entail
registering for a philosophy class or two
and reading the “canon philosophers”
of the Western philosophical tradition.
Reading a philosopher’s work may or may
not influence a person philosophically
because
developing
philosophical
capacities requires more than simply
a general reading of the texts. Rather,
the advancement of philosophical skills
requires a mentor’s guidance on how
to apply philosophical thought and
skills to texts, everyday happenings, life
circumstances, political affairs, and social
issues. Whether the mentor’s teaching
approach is more comparable to a Socratic
or a Confucian has little relevance in light
of the enriching education a person could
earn from developing his/her philosophical
capacities to the fullest potential.
Through implementing philosophical
discourse into the foundations of and
across all disciplines in American public
higher education as a requirement
within each specialized field, students
can have opportune access to the
resources required for cultivating their
philosophical
capacities.
Moreover,
cultivating philosophical capacities can
efficiently help us understand these
nearly unsolvable conflicts and have the
philosophical aptitudes to mediate them
within the broadest contexts possible,
rather than unknowingly drifting to one
extreme or the other.

32. Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 8-11.
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